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THE 101 CONUNDRUM: CREATING A FRAMEWORK TO SOLVE 
PROBLEMS SURROUNDING INTERPRETATION OF 35 U.S.C. § 101 
 ROBERT MAZZOLA* 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 101 cases are a particularly vexing subject for practicing 
patent attorneys, and are the subject of much contention and debate.1 
In an effort to quell assertions of expansive, questionable patents, the 
Supreme Court has, in a series of landmark decisions, broadened the 
judicially created exclusions from patentable subject matter: abstract 
ideas, laws of nature, and naturally occurring substances.2 These re-
cent efforts have spawned a “101 Conundrum,” in which courts strug-
gle both to delineate the breadth of these categorical exclusions and 
preserve the integrity of the patent system. The Supreme Court has ne-
glected to define these categories,3 and has rejected the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit’s (“CAFC”) attempt to provide bright-line 
clarity.4 With due respect, the Supreme Court’s § 101 jurisprudence is 
replete with inconsistencies and fails to provide practicing attorneys 
and judges with adequate guidance. Without guiding principles for ad-
judging patentable subject matter, judges and examiners may inject 
their personal views into deciding which patent claims5 merit protec-
 
  
* J. D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco, CA; Incoming As-
sociate at Haynes and Boone, LLP. 
 1.  A § 101 case is one where the validity of a patent is adjudicated under 35 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012), which reads: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a pa-
tent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” The Supreme Court has 
articulated that § 101 explicitly sets forth four categories of patentable subject matter: processes, 
machines, articles of manufacture and compositions of matter. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 
(2010). 
 2.  See id., see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 
2116 (2013) (“The three categories of patent ineligible subject matter are non-statutory “implicit 
exception[s]” to the patent laws.”). 
 3.  See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612 (“The Court, therefore, need not define further what consti-
tutes a patentable ‘process’ . . . . “); see also Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134. S. Ct. 2347, 
2357 (2014) (“In any event, we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ide-
as’ category in this case.”) 
 4.  See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612–13 (rejecting machine-or-transformation test). 
 5.  Claims are the essence of the patent, because they are the part of the patent where an 
applicant attempts to define the scope of the legal monopoly granted by a patent. See MPEP § 
2171 (9th ed. Mar. 2014). In every patent, a patentee must include one or more claims to define 
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tion and control the deciding factor, i.e., whether an invention is within 
an ineligible category, regardless of the patent’s effect on promoting 
the useful arts.6 
There is an answer to resolving this uncertainty, however. The key 
to unlocking the Court’s reasoning regarding patentable subject matter 
can be found in an exchange between Justice Kennedy and counsel for 
petitioners during oral argument in the most recent case regarding pa-
tentable subject matter, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l.7 During 
oral argument, Counsel effectively conceded that the patent at issue 
“would be fairly easy to program,” and could be implemented in a 
“weekend” by “any computer group of people sitting around a coffee 
shop in Silicon Valley.”8 While these qualitative factors of time, effort, 
and expertise were not explicitly present in the opinion, it is clear that 
the dialogue during oral argument informed the Court’s opinion that 
the patent at issue was merely a “generic implementation.”9 In other 
words, the idea underlying the patent itself was something that could 
be implemented by a person of ordinary skill in the art fairly easily. 
This exchange helps one understand that the generic implementation 
standard articulated by the Court can be restated to require that the 
idea underlying a patent must be more than simply self-enabling. 
This Article describes the concept of self-enablement and explains 
how it is a construct that has been underpinning the Court’s logic in 
other cases regarding patentable subject matter preceding Alice. Es-
sentially, the self-enablement doctrine involves an inquiry into wheth-
er the invention as a whole could be implemented by a person of ordi-
nary skill in the art (“POSITA”) using well known and conventional 
techniques, without undue experimentation. I add the language “undue 
 
what the patentee has the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling. Each claim is 
numbered, and includes one or more clauses, separated by semi-colons, called limitations.  
 6.  The Constitution provides Congress with the power to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries. . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This provision provides 
for promoting “science” by granting protection for “writings” via Copyright, and promoting “use-
ful Arts” for “Discoveries” via Patent. Thus, in enacting laws that enable patent protection, Con-
gress has acted to promote the “useful Arts” rather than “science.” See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 
958 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff’d sub. nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980). 
 7.  134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
 8.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, 12, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 
2347 (2014) (No. 13-298). 
 9.  See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (“the relevant question is whether the claims here do more 
than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement 
on a generic computer. . . . In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to 
perform generic computer functions. . . . Viewed as a whole, petitioner’s method claims simply 
recite the concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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experimentation” to the Court’s articulation of the standard in order to 
borrow the qualitative aspect of the enablement doctrine under § 
112.10 Referencing undue experimentation brings a wealth of robust 
case law, and offers the promise of bringing coherence to an area that 
has frustrated many across time. This Article explains the history of 
cases adjudicated under §101, and outlines how self-enablement is the 
concept that the Court has struggled to articulate in defining patenta-
ble subject matter. 
The framework in this Article takes into account underlying con-
siderations of the Supreme Court in determining whether a patent is 
simply an “abstract idea,” “natural law,” or “naturally occurring sub-
stance.” One advantage of developing a framework in this fashion is 
that it obviates the need for a legislative remedy because it directly ap-
plies language from Supreme Court decisions to create a test for pa-
tentability that replaces the current framework. 
This Article unfolds as follows. Part II explains the current stand-
ard for adjudging patentable subject matter as articulated in the latest 
§ 101 cases. It also gives a brief introduction to the uncertainty created 
by recent precedent, including a hypothetical application of the current 
framework, which reveals a puzzling result based on a recent district 
court case, McRO, Inc. v. Activision Publ., Inc.11 In McRO, the claimed in-
vention at issue was found to be paradoxically “tangible,” yet “ab-
stract.”12 Part III provides two pieces of historical background. The 
first, in Part III(A), draws parallels between the Court’s current § 101 
jurisprudence and the Court’s jurisprudence prior to the enactment of 
§ 103.13 This section explains how courts are showing signs of repeat-
 
 10.  35 U.S.C. § 112 contains several requirements, including, inter alia, written description, 
enablement, and particularity. Each specification must contain a written description. In Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co. 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), the CAFC 
held that the written description requirement is a separate requirement from enablement in § 
112. A satisfactory written description contains precise definitions of a claimed genus such that a 
POSITA can recognize all members of the genus. Id. at 1350 (citations omitted). Enablement re-
quires that each specification must also sufficiently describe the invention in such detail that it 
enables a POSITA to make and use the invention without undue experimentation. In re Wright, 
999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (citation omitted). Conversely if a POSITA could not make or use the inven-
tion without undue experimentation, the claimed invention is not enabled. Id. Particularity re-
quires that claims must point out and distinctly claim the subject matter of the invention. See Nau-
tilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (“A patent is invalid for 
indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the patent’s specification and prosecution history, fail 
to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.”). 
 11.  See McRO, Inc. v. Activision Publ., Inc., No. 14-CV-336-GW(FFMx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
135152, at *25–26 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (non-obviousness): prevents patentees from claiming inventions that 
could be created by making modifications to prior art without any degree of skill or ingenuity. 
Specifically, § 103 precludes patentability when the differences between a claimed invention and 
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ing the capricious decision-making that preceded the enactment of the 
1952 Patent Act through the use of the “inventive application” re-
quirement under § 101. The second background, in Part III(B), is com-
prised of a detailed history of the ineligible categories and reveals 
some of the themes that have arisen in the cases. One such prominent 
theme is “preemption.” This focused history of patent law pinpoints 
the genesis of problematic language used in recent cases and its uncer-
tain implications. Part IV addresses some of the inconsistencies creat-
ed by the cases outlined in Part III(B) and attempts to answer some of 
the key questions raised. In particular, this section explains how pa-
tentable subject matter can change over time, and how the role of § 
101 can be delineated from §§ 102 (novelty) and 103 (non-
obviousness).14 The end of Part IV introduces a more rigorous stand-
ard for approaching the important question of whether subject matter 
is patent eligible under § 101. As previously noted, the proposed test 
for determining whether a claimed invention is merely an abstract idea 
essentially asks whether or not the underlying idea of the patent is, in 
effect, “self-enabling” to a POSITA. Part V addresses recent develop-
ments in the law, and specifically explains the district court’s reasoning 
in McRO, and how the court could have benefitted from a more robust 
standard for evaluating patentable subject matter instead of relying on 
outdated precedent. Part V also discusses Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu 
LLC15, one of the first CAFC decisions to follow Alice, and addresses its 
overall the impact on the patent system. Specifically, the outcomes in 
Alice, Ultramercial, and McRO portend unfavorable circumstances not 
 
relevant prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before 
the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a POSITA. This analysis comprises several fac-
tual inquiries, including: (1) the nature and scope of the art; (2) differences between the prior art 
and the claims at issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time invention; and (4) sec-
ondary considerations. Secondary considerations generally consist of extrinsic evidence that bol-
sters or weakens the case for non-obviousness, including, inter alia, evidence that others had 
failed to produce the invention, industry skepticism or rebuke of attempting to create the inven-
tion, recognition of the claimed invention as a long felt but unsolved need, industry praise, com-
mercial success, copying, whether the invention could be produced as a result of a combination of 
prior art references and whether there was a teaching, suggestion or motivation to combine those 
references. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966), see also, e.g., 
Ecolochem, Inc. v. Southern California Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 
U.S. 974 (2001). 
 14.  35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty): requires that claimed inventions possess at least one novel 
feature in order to not be anticipated by a single prior art reference. For patent applications filed 
after March 16, 2013, the America Invents Act (“AIA”) established a “first to file” system, such that 
a patentee cannot establish an earlier date than his or her effective filing date. The pre-AIA 
framework is a “first to invent” system, such that it allows for a patentee to establish an earlier 
date than his or her effective filing date. 
 15.  Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
404 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 14:2 
only for patents held by so-called “patent trolls,”16 but patents held by 
small inventors as well. 
II. ALICE AND ITS IMPACT 
The Supreme Court established the most recent § 101 framework 
in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l.17  In Alice, the Court utilized lan-
guage from Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.18 to ar-
ticulate a two part test for determining whether a claimed invention 
recites patentable subject matter.19 The first step of the test involves 
determining whether a claim is directed to one of the ineligible catego-
ries of § 101.20 The second step includes analyzing whether the claim’s 
elements, considered both individually and as an ordered combination, 
“transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.”21 
This latter step of the analysis is designed to search for an “inventive 
concept” where, “[s]imply appending conventional steps, specified at a 
high level of generality” to a method already well known is “not 
enough to supply [the] inventive concept” needed to make the trans-
formation.22 
A. The Status Quo – Recent Application of Alice 
Consider the following hypothetical. A small start-up company, 
specializing in animation software, staffed with a team of prodigious 
engineers, creates  software for automatically animating lip synchroni-
zation and facial expressions of three dimensional (3D) characters that 
rapidly reduces production costs. The start-up invests in patenting the 
highly coveted software to protect it from being copied by other ani-
mation companies, especially sophisticated animation companies 
equipped with clever methods of reverse engineering that escape the 
protections of copyright law. The start-up’s founders rely on its patents 
to secure venture capital funding. With dauntless disregard for the 
 
 16.  A patent troll, according to some scholars, is a company that aggregates patents and 
does not engage in the manufacturing of products. Trolls often extract a disproportionate return 
from operating companies far beyond the value their patented invention adds to the commercial 
product. Tom Ewing and Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV., 1 (2012), 
available at http://stlr.standford.edu/pdf/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf. 
 17.  134 S. Ct. at 2355.  
 18.  132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 19.  See id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1296–97 (2012)). 
 20.  Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.  
 21.  Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297) (internal quotations omitted). 
 22.  Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294) (internal quotations omitted). 
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start-up’s patent rights, larger companies in the field replicate and uti-
lize the start-up’s invention. 
The start-up quickly hires a team of lawyers to pursue the infring-
ers in an effort to recoup investors’ losses. Yet with the stroke of a pen 
and the bash of a gavel, the start-up’s patent is reduced to nothing. A 
trial judge characterizes the invention as naught more than a fanciful 
“abstract idea,” unworthy of patent protection by a system that has 
recognized far less as deserving of such protection.23 Regardless of 
one’s position on whether patent monopolies have exceeded its limits, 
it is still quite incredible to suppose that a system for “automatically 
animating lip synchronization and facial expressions of 3D characters” 
is nothing more than an “abstract idea.”24 
The above scenario, although dramatized for emphasis, is from a 
recent case, McRO, Inc., v. Activision Publishing, Inc.  McRO is just one of 
at least a dozen others in a recent torrent of district court decisions in-
validating computer software patents in the wake of Alice.25 In the past 
year alone, one report states that fifty-five district court and CAFC de-
cisions out of seventy-eight included a successful challenge under § 
101 to invalidate one or more patents.26 Alice itself is one of a series of 
recent Supreme Court decisions in patent law, an area on which the 
Supreme Court had not spoken for many years until Bilski v. Kappos in 
2010.27 The Supreme Court’s recent interest in patent law appears to 
have been provoked by a series of decisions by the CAFC, which han-
dles all patent cases.28 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s foray into 
patent law has not provided the much needed guidance many hoped it 
would provide. 
One difficulty with the Court’s methodology is that it does not 
thoroughly explain how it arrives at its judicial determinations of pa-
 
 23.  See, e.g., User-Operated Amusement Apparatus for Kicking the User’s Buttocks, .U.S. Pa-
tent No. 6,293,874 (filed Jan. 4, 2000); Method and Apparatus for Yoga Class Imaging and Stream-
ing, U.S. Patent No. 8,605,152 (filed Feb. 8, 2013); Process for the Treatment of Methane Emis-
sions, U.S. Patent No. 8,071,342 (filed Dec. 29, 2005). 
 24.  See McRO, Inc. v. Activision Publ., Inc., No. 14-CV-336-GW(FFMx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
135152, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014). 
 25.  See id. at *1, *38; see also Timothy B. Lee, Software Patents Are Crumbling, Thanks to the 
Supreme Court, VOX (Sept. 12, 2014, 3:50pm), 
http://www.vox.com/2014/9/12/6138483/software-patents-are-crumbling-thanks-to-the-
supreme-court. 
 26.  See Robert R. Sachs, Tracking #Alicestorm: The Dead Keep Piling Up, BilskiBlog (April 10, 
2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/ (last visited May 6, 2015). 
 27.  See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).  
 28.  See Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, THE GREEN BAG, (forthcoming 
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2496763. 
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tentable subject matter. This criticism is best captured in a concur-
rence by Justice Stevens in Bilski v. Kappos: 
[T]he Court artificially limits petitioners’ claims to hedging, and then 
concludes that hedging is an abstract idea rather than a term that 
describes a category of processes including petitioners’ claims. Why 
the Court does this is never made clear . . . . The Court essentially as-
serts its conclusion that petitioners’ application claims an abstract 
idea. This mode of analysis (or lack thereof) may have led to the cor-
rect outcome in this case, but it also means that the Court’s musings 
on this issue stand for very little.29 
While some may be inclined to agree with the outcomes of many § 
101 cases, as Stevens did in Bilski, the § 101 cases themselves provide 
little guidance for courts in analyzing future decisions.30 
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Repeating History 
In the decades before § 103 was drafted, courts fashioned an addi-
tional requirement beyond proving novelty: the “invention require-
ment.”31 This requirement was an arbitrary threshold and prompted 
immediate concern, particularly because of the “unfettered decision-
making” of judges reviewing the validity of inventions. 32  According to 
one famous patent lawyer and esteemed judge, Giles Rich, the “re-
quirement for invention . . . left every judge practically scot-free to de-
cide [the] . . . controlling factor according to his personal philosophy of 
what inventions should be patented, whether or not he had any com-
petence to do so or any knowledge of the patent system as an operative 
socioeconomic force.”33 
In many of the decisions preceding the 1952 Patent Act, the Court 
fashioned unworkable, inconsistent, and nonsensical rules that left 
lower courts unable to decide cases based on a principled analysis. In 
one decision, for instance, Lincoln Eng’g Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 
the Supreme Court decided the patentability of an improved “coupling 
member” for attaching a headed fitting to a grease gun.34 The patent 
claim included not only the coupling member, but the coupling mem-
 
 29.  Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 620–21 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 30.  See, e.g., McRO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135152, at *13 (“[T]he two-part test for identifying 
an abstract idea appears to be of limited utility . . . .”). 
 31.  CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS, 348, (3d ed., 2014). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by Section 103 of the 1952 Pa-
tent Act, in NONOBVIOUSNESS: THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 1:401, 1:409 (John F. With-
erspoon ed., 1980) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
 34.  Lincoln Eng’g Co. of Ill. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549 (1938). 
2015] INTERPRETATIONS OF 35 USC 407 
ber in connection with the headed fitting and the grease gun.35 The 
Court held that combining a new and non-obvious component, i.e. the 
coupling member, with “old and well known devices[,]” i.e. the headed 
fitting and grease gun, which performed “no new or different func-
tion[,]” did not result in a patentable invention.36 Essentially, the 
Court’s rule in Lincoln Engineering was that even if an article or pro-
cess (A) is patentable by itself, if it is combined with other devices or 
steps (B and C), a claim to (A–C) is not patentable if the combination 
performs fundamentally the same function as B and C.37 This rule 
would cause serious difficulties for patentees attempting to avoid pa-
tent exhaustion,38 for instance, in the case where he or she is unable to 
market device (A) alone, without combining A with B and C. If the pa-
tentee can only patent device (A) alone, and the patentee cannot not 
make money by selling device (A) alone, then the patentee may lose in-
centive to produce device (A) because the patentee is unable to profit 
from the invention without combining it with B and C. Hence, this case 
was one among many that galvanized efforts to enact patent reform, 
and was effectively overruled with the passage of the 1952 Patent 
Act.39 
This “invention requirement” bears a striking resemblance to the 
evolving “inventive application” requirement in the Court’s modern § 
101 jurisprudence, as first introduced in Parker v. Flook.40 Courts were 
previously able to rule out elements of claims as being “well-known” 
without any factual basis and determine that inventions, while tangi-
ble, are paradoxically “abstract.” As the saying goes, “[t]hose who can-
not remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”41  Without a rubric 
to guide courts in determining patentable subject matter, specifically a 
factual determination of what ideas simply apply “well-understood, 
 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id. at 548–49.  
 37.  See id. at 549–50. 
 38.  See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) (defining patent exhaus-
tion as follows: “The patentee may surrender his monopoly in whole by the sale of his patent or in 
part by the sale of an article embodying the invention. His monopoly remains so long as he retains 
the ownership of the patented article.”) 
 39.  See In re Bernhart and Fetter, 417 F.2d 1395, 1402–03 (1969); see also Radio Steel & 
Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 731 F.2d 840, 845 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (reaffirming Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals’ holding that “the only proper basis for an old combination rejection is . . . section 
112”) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 
418 (2007) (“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved [unpatentable] merely by 
demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.”) (emphasis 
added).  
 40.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978). 
 41.  George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, in THE LIFE OF REASON, 1, 284 (2d ed., Charles 
Scribner’s Sons 1948). 
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routine, [and] conventional activit[ies,]”42 there will no doubt be a re-
version to the capricious decision-making process that preceded the 
enactment of § 103. 
B. A Summary of the Supreme Court’s Approach to Interpretation of 
§ 101 
When one examines the leading § 101 cases, there are several 
prominent themes that emerge. The most important is called “preemp-
tion,” and from preemption, the Court derives two additional distinct 
principles: (a) there must be at least one inventive application,43 and 
(b) the claimed invention must be “more than a simple step” from an 
underlying idea.44 The doctrine of preemption holds that patent claims 
that would broadly preclude the use of basic tools of research are un-
patentable.45 The concerns surrounding the idea of preemption stem 
from the fear that patents claiming the basic tools of research hinder, 
rather than promote, innovation.46  It is from this concern that the cat-
egories are supposedly derived.47  One of the first cases to recognize 
the importance of avoiding preemption in patent law was O’Reilly v. 
Morse, in which the patentee, Morse, attempted to claim the invention 
of the telegraph in the following manner: 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery . . . de-
scribed in the foregoing specifications and claims; the essence of the 
invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvan-
ic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed for 
marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters at any 
distances, being a new application of that power of which I claim to 
be the first inventor or discoverer.48 
Because Morse did not limit his claim to the particular uses set out 
in the specification, the Court held that he effectively claimed the ex-
clusive right to every improvement where the motive power was elec-
tro-magnetic and the invention achieved writing at a distance.49 It is 
certainly true, in this case, that there was complete preemption of the 
idea in the abstract because the patent was not limited to any particu-
 
 42.  Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). 
 43.  Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966). 
 44.  See Flook, 437 U.S. at 590. 
 45.  See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 658 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 46.  See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 47.  See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 601–02 (“While these exceptions are not required by the statutory 
text, they are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’ And, 
in any case, these exceptions have defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare 
decisis going back 150 years”) (quotations in original) (emphasis in original). 
 48.  O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112 (1853) (internal quotations omitted). 
 49.  Id.  
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lar machinery. However, under current laws, precedent, and proce-
dures set out in the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (MPEP), 
examiners would be more likely to reject Morse’s claim under § 112 
because he had failed to enable every embodiment that includes writ-
ing at a distance, such as text messaging.50 
In Brenner v. Manson, the Supreme Court expressed that § 101 
demands that a claimed invention must have at least one useful appli-
cation in order to be patentable.51 When invalidating a patent on a new 
class of steroids, the Court famously decreed that “a patent is not a 
hunting license”52 and “[u]ntil the process claim has been reduced to 
production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of 
that monopoly are not capable of precise delineation.”53 The Court rea-
soned that the patent failed to qualify as “new and useful” under § 101 
because the steroids at issue had no demonstrated application other 
than an “object of use-testing”.54 
The Court revisited the preemption doctrine in Gottschalk v. Ben-
son, where it addressed the validity of a software patent directed to the 
conversion of binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals to binary numer-
als.55 The Court concluded that the process claim was drafted so ab-
stractly that it covered “both known and unknown uses of the BCD to 
pure binary conversion,” and thus there was complete preemption.56 
This conclusion was based on two premises: (1) the conversion was 
merely a series of mathematical calculations, each of which could be 
done mentally,57 and (2) the conversion’s only useful function was on a 
computer and so preempted every “substantial practical application,” 
thus constituting a patent effectively on the mathematical formula it-
self.58 Essentially, the rule from Benson is that if the patent claims a 
mathematical formula that has only one substantial practical applica-
tion that is covered by the claims in the patent, then the claim achieves 
de facto complete preemption of the formula itself, and therefore is not 
patentable. 
Following its reasoning in Benson, the Supreme Court in Parker v. 
Flook pronounced that an invention must also be more than a simple 
 
 50.  See 35 USC § 112(b) (2012); see also MPEP § 2173 (9th ed. Mar. 2014).  
 51.  Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966). 
 52.  Id. at 534, 536. 
 53.  Id. at 534.  
 54.  Id. at 535.  
 55.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972). 
 56.  Id. at 68.  
 57.  See id. at 67. 
 58.  See id. at.71–72. 
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step from an unpatentable idea.59 The Court resolved that even if an in-
ventor adds insignificant post-solution components, or limits the use of 
the abstract idea to one field of use, this addition does not save a claim 
from being an unpatentable abstract idea.60  In Flook, the Court held 
that the system of updating alarms for a catalytic converter process 
was a mere “post-solution” activity even though it did not wholly 
preempt the use of the mathematical formula and thus the claimed in-
vention was not patentable subject matter.61 The Court implicitly as-
sumed that, although scientific principles and mathematical formulas 
are a product of human thought, their existence is independent of hu-
man activity. Thus, a mathematical algorithm, like a scientific principle, 
reveals a relationship that “has always existed[.]”62 Hence, mathemati-
cal algorithms cannot be patented63 even if they are novel (i.e. origi-
nal). Similarly, claims that encompass specific uses of mathematical 
formulas are also ineligible for patent protection.64 The Court ex-
plained: 
The chemical processes involved in catalytic conversion of hydro-
carbons are well known, as are the practice of monitoring the chemi-
cal process variables, the use of alarm limits to trigger alarms, the 
notion that alarm limit values must be recomputed and readjusted, 
and the use of computers for ‘automatic monitoring-
alarming’. . .respondent’s claim is, in effect, comparable to a claim 
that the formula 2[pi]r can be usefully applied in determining the 
circumference of a wheel.65 
Although the Court’s logic employs a kind of petitio principii,66 the 
Court’s rule is that a patent that employs the use of a mathematical 
formula will not become patentable by merely asserting a token im-
plementation of the formula.67  The token implementation is insuffi-
cient to overcome the § 101 hurdle because the determination of pa-
tent eligibility should not depend simply on the “draftsman’s art” in 
 
 59.  See Flook, 437 U.S. at 590.  
 60.  Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11.  
 61.  Flook, 437 U.S. at 589–90. 
 62.  Flook, 437 U.S. at 592 (“We think this case must also be considered as if the principle or 
mathematical formula were well known”); Id. at 593 n. 15 (“The underlying notion is that a scien-
tific principle, such as that expressed in respondent’s algorithm, reveals a relationship that has 
always existed”). 
 63.  Id. at 585.  
 64.  Id. at 595 (quoting In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (1977)). 
 65.  Flook, 437 U.S. at 594–95.  
 66.  The Court’s argument is essentially circular because the Court began with assuming that 
the mathematical formula was part of the prior art, see note 63, and then relied on this assump-
tion to base its conclusion that the patent was nothing more than patenting the simple application 
of a mathematical formula.  
 67.  See id. at 595; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981). 
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masking the patenting of an unpatentable formula.68 In other words, 
the Court is concerned that a patentee can appear to limit the invention 
to one field of use through careful ‘draftsmanship,’ and then later, after 
patent issuance, can prevent others from using the invention in other 
fields of use. How a patentee might do this is never explained, but one 
possible way is through the doctrine of equivalents.  This idea is dis-
cussed further in Part IV. 
The Supreme Court retreated from its rule articulated in Flook69 in 
Diamond v. Diehr. In Diehr, the Court upheld the validity of a patent di-
rected to “a process for curing synthetic rubber which includes in sev-
eral of its steps the use of a mathematical formula and a programmed 
digital computer.”70 A slim majority (5 Justices) held that the claim was 
not an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather a claim to 
an “industrial process for the molding of rubber products.”71 The Court 
characterized the claim as not merely being a token activity, because 
the mathematical equation involved was simply used in “conjunction 
with all of the other steps in their claimed process.”72 The Court 
acknowledged that the process employed a “well-known mathematical 
equation”73 but noted that “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a 
process, or even of the process itself, [was] of no relevance in determin-
ing whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 catego-
ries of possibly patentable subject matter.”74 
The Court revisited the preemption doctrine again in Bilski v. Kap-
pos, where the Court analyzed a patent claim it characterized as “hedg-
ing risk and the application of that concept to energy markets.”75 The 
Supreme Court reversed the CAFC in Bilski and rejected the patent 
 
 68.  Flook, 437 U.S. at 593.  
 69.  Scholars have characterized the facts of Diehr and Flook as being “uncomfortably simi-
lar[.]” Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of Neither Party, Professor Robin Feldman, p. 23 n. 10, Alice 
Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 70.  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187. Later decisions characterize the holding ad hoc to describe a 
process that was novel even though the Court may no findings about the novelty of the process. 
See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (“the claims in Diehr were patent eligible because they improved an 
existing technological process, not because they were implemented on a computer.”) (emphasis 
added), see also Mayo, 133 S. Ct. at 1299 (“[Diehr] nowhere suggested that all these steps, or at 
least the combination of those steps, were in context obvious, already in use, or purely conven-
tional.”), see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 (“Diehr claimed a previously unknown method for molding 
raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products using a mathematical formula.” (in-
ternal quotations omitted)). 
 73.  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186.  
 74.  Id. at 188; Id. at n. 13 (rejecting argument that claim must be dissected into “old and new 
elements”). This shift in position can be explained in part by the fact that four Justices from the 
majority in Flook were in the dissent in Diehr. 
 75.  Bilski, 561 U.S. at 609. 
412 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 14:2 
claim, quoting Chief Judge Rader’s dissent: “[h]edging is a fundamental 
economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and 
taught in any introductory finance class.”76 The Supreme Court then 
concluded that: 
The concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a math-
ematical formula in claim 4 is an unpatentable abstract idea, just like 
the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook. Allowing petitioners to 
patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, 
and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.77 
Thus, the Court reemphasized the complete preemption doctrine, 
but also revived the more than a simple step rule articulated in Flook by 
holding that: (1) limiting the abstract idea of hedging risk to “one field 
of use,” i.e., the energy market, and (2) adding “token post-solution 
components,” i.e., the use of “well-known random analysis techniques,” 
were both insufficient to overcome being an unpatentable “abstract 
idea.”78 In addition, the Court’s new rule in Bilski introduced an ele-
ment of novelty into the “abstract idea” inquiry, ascribing significance 
to the fact that the methods for hedging were “well-known” in the art, 
contrary to the Court’s earlier repudiation of interjecting novelty into 
the § 101 analysis in Diehr. This contradiction is discussed in greater 
depth in Part IV. 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. involved a patent di-
rected to a method of treating immune mediated gastrointestinal dis-
order in two steps: (1) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine 
to a patient, and (2) determining the level of 6-thioguanine.79  To de-
termine the level of 6-thioguanine, the claim specified a range of con-
centrations where certain levels corresponded with a need to increase 
or decrease concentration of the drug.80 The Court held that the claim 
was nothing more than exploiting the “natural relationship” of the hu-
man body’s metabolization of thiopurine.81 Although the substance 
was synthetic, the Court noted that scientists were already familiar 
with the correlation between harmful and beneficial doses of the 
drug.82 To arrive at his ‘invention’ therefore, the patentee had simply 
 
 76.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, C.J., dissenting). Arguably Rad-
er’s quote was taken out of context, as a sentence prior he wrote: “Bilski’s method for hedging risk 
in commodities trading is either a vague economic concept or obvious on its face.” Id. at 1013 (em-
phasis added). Thus, this statement suggests that Judge Rader would have rejected the claim un-
der § 112 for indefiniteness or alternatively under § 103 for obviousness. 
 77.  Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611–12.  
 78.  See id. at 612. 
 79.  Mayo, 133 S. Ct. at 1295. 
 80.  Id. at 1296. 
 81.  Id. at 1297.  
 82.  Id. at 1295.  
2015] INTERPRETATIONS OF 35 USC 413 
identified the “correlations with some precision.”83 The second step in 
the patent, which told “doctors to engage in well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists in the field,” 
added nothing “significantly more than an instruction to doctors to ap-
ply the applicable [natural] laws.”84 Accordingly, the rule articulated in 
Mayo is that whether or not a claim adds “significantly more” to a natu-
ral law is judged in light of prior art.85 However, the Court is silent as to 
what art is relevant under § 101, and how this inquiry is distinct from 
the non-obviousness inquiry of § 103.86 This is also discussed in great-
er depth in Part IV. 
In Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. the Su-
preme Court addressed the third category of ineligible subject matter, 
naturally occurring substances, and decided two questions: first, 
whether a patent may issue for an isolated DNA segment that is identi-
cal to how it appears in the human body, and second, whether a patent 
may issue for “synthetically created DNA,” i.e., complimentary DNA 
(cDNA), which is functionally equivalent to a native DNA segment 
without the non-coding regions.87 The patents at issue were the result 
of Myriad’s discovery of the location and sequence of the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes, which enable detection of an increased risk of breast 
cancer.88 By knowing the typical nucleotide sequence of the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes, one can extract a sample of a test subject’s DNA, com-
pare that sample to the typical sequence(s), and then detect mutations 
in the test subject’s DNA.89 If mutations are detected, then there  is an 
increased risk of breast cancer.90 To discover these sequences, Myriad 
used an “iterative process” that was “well understood,” uniform, and 
widely used insofar as any scientist engaged in the search for a gene 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 1298.  
 85.  Prior art includes any reference used to preclude patentability under §§ 102 or 103. Pri-
or art may encompass written sources and unwritten sources, subject to the language and inter-
pretation of §§ 102 and 103. To be prior art, a reference must antedate the priority date of the 
invention and must be analogous, meaning that it exists in the field of endeavor of the invention 
or it is reasonably pertinent to the problem that the invention solves. See In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 
658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 86.  See id. at 1304 (“We recognize that, in evaluating the significance of additional steps, the 
§ 101 patent eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap. But 
that need not always be so. And to shift the patent eligibility inquiry entirely to these later sec-
tions risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty, while assuming that those sections can 
do work that they are not equipped to do”). 
 87.  133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).  
 88.  Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2112–13. 
 89.  Id. at 2112, 2117 (citation omitted). 
 90.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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would have likely used a similar approach.91  For this discovery, how-
ever, Myriad obtained two patents: one on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes as they appear in the human body, and another on the corre-
sponding cDNA.92 The Court held that merely isolating a certain subset 
of the entire genomic sequence of human DNA is insufficient to make it 
patentable.93 On the other hand, the second patent, which claimed 
cDNA, was ‘substantively different’ from how it appeared in the human 
body, and therefore was not naturally occurring.94 The Court left open 
the possibility that the second patent was obvious, stating that it “ex-
press[es] no opinion whether cDNA satisfies the other statutory re-
quirements of patentability.”95 
The result in Myriad is perplexing insofar as its jurisprudence is 
inconsistent with Bilski and Mayo. The Court had not overlooked the 
facts that the process used to isolate the DNA sequence was “well un-
derstood,” and the creation of synthetic DNA was “well known.”96 Thus, 
Myriad stands apart from cases requiring that the patentee contribute 
“significantly more” than what already occurs in nature. Despite the 
fact that cDNA is trivially different from the patent ineligible native 
DNA sequence, the Court did not require that the invention be more 
than a simple step from the naturally occurring substance, only that it 
be structurally distinct.  Myriad thus sets the ineligible category of 
“naturally occurring” substances apart from the abstract idea and nat-
ural law categories addressed in Flook and Mayo, respectively. 
Finally, the Court’s most recent § 101 case, Alice, addressed the 
patentability of a computer program designed to mitigate settlement 
risk.97 The Court declared that “the relevant question is whether the 
claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement 
the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer.”98 
The Court first analyzed each element of the claim separately, and then 
as “an ordered combination.”99 The Court found that each step of the 
process was “purely conventional,”  recited “basic functions of a com-
puter[,]” and that the functions were “well-understood, routine, con-
ventional, activities” previously known to the industry.100 Considering 
 
 91.  Id. at 2118–20 (citation omitted).  
 92.  Id. at 2116, 2119.  
 93.  Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2120. 
 94.  Id. at 2119.  
 95.  Id. at 2119 n.9 (citation omitted).  
 96.  Id. at 2112, 2119.  
 97.  Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2351.  
 98.   Id. at 2359. 
 99.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 100.  Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the claim as a whole, the Court found that the claims did not, for exam-
ple, “improve the functioning of the computer itself,”or “effect an im-
provement in any other technology or technical field.”101 Rather, the 
claims were “nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply 
the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, 
generic computer.”102 The Court seemed to focus on the notion that the 
patent at issue was nothing more than a “wholly generic computer im-
plementation.” At oral argument, Justice Kennedy twice inquired about 
how difficult it would be to create a program for intermediated settle-
ment: 
“If you describe that to a second-year college class in engineering 
and said here’s - - here’s my idea, now you go home and you program 
over this weekend, my guess is - - my guess is that that would be fairly 
easy to program.” 
Mr. Phillips, Counsel for Petitioners: “I don’t disagree with it, Jus-
tice . . . .” 
. . . . 
“Suppose I thought - - and, again, it’s just a thought because I don’t 
have the expertise - - that any computer group of people sitting around 
a coffee shop in Silicon Valley could do this over a weekend. Suppose I 
thought that.” 
“You mean wrote the code?” 
“Yes.” 
“Right. Well, that’s absolutely - - I’m certain that’s true. . . . But 
that’s true of almost all software.”103 
 
Thus, it became apparent to the Justices that the claimed program 
in the patent was nothing more than a “generic” implementation of an 
abstract idea, i.e., mitigating settlement risk, which became a pervasive 
theme in Justice Thomas’ opinion.104 The Court reasoned that the pro-
 
 101.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 102.  Id. at 2360 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, 12, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 
(2014) (No. 13-298).  
 104.  Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352 (“[M]erely requiring generic computer implementation fails to 
transform abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”) (emphasis added); Id. at 2357 (“We 
conclude that the method claims, which merely require generic computer implementation, fail to 
transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”) (emphasis added); Id. at 2358 
(“mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a 
patent-eligible invention. . . . Given the ubiquity of computers . . . wholly generic computer imple-
mentation is not generally the sort of additional feature that provides any practical assurance that 
the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the abstract idea itself.”) (em-
phasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Id. at 2359 (“the relevant 
question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement 
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gram effectively preempted the use of the abstract idea of mitigating 
settlement because it was merely a generic implementation.105 Despite 
the term “generic” being echoed throughout the Court’s opinion, the 
term was never distinctly explained. Part IV of this paper attempts to 
interpret what a “generic implementation” is in light of other prece-
dent and harmonize Alice with other § 101 cases. Specifically, Part IV 
clarifies what generic means for inventions that “preempt” the use of 
an abstract idea, natural law, or naturally occurring substance. 
IV. IMPORTANT QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE § 101 CASES 
A. Reconciliation of Inconsistencies 
Even a cursory review of the § 101 cases discussed in Part III re-
veals a number of inconsistencies and points of uncertainty in the law. 
Some of the questions that arise from the cases that are asked and (at-
tempted to be) resolved in this section: 
1. Does patentable subject matter change over time? If so, 
why? 
2. What function does § 101 provide in limiting patentable 
subject matter that §§ 102 and 103 do not? 
3. What is the generic implementation standard? How is the 
“generic implementation” analysis distinct from analysis 
under §§ 102 and 103? 
4. What function does § 101 provide in limiting patentable 
subject matter that § 112 does not? What is the relationship 
of § 101 to the doctrine of equivalents? 
5. Does the generic implementation requirement contravene 
other provisions of § 103? 
6. How could courts more uniformly evaluate whether an in-
vention is patentable under § 101? 
1. How patentable subject matter changes over time 
The Supreme Court appears to vacillate between patentable sub-
ject matter being timeless, and being time-contingent. As a result, some 
inventions might be patentable subject matter under § 101 at one time 
and not at other times. Recall from Part III, the Court in Diehr ex-
 
the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer. . . . In short, each step does 
no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. . . . Viewed as a 
whole, petitioner’s method claims simply recite the concept of intermediated settlement as per-
formed by a generic computer.”) (emphasis added).  
 105.  Id. at 2358.  
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pressed that “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or 
even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the 
subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly 
patentable subject matter.”106 Yet later in Alice, the Court broke down 
the claim into elements and examined whether each step is “well-
known” or not in determining patentability. This inconsistency can be 
explained through understanding the evolution of the “preemption” 
doctrine throughout the case law. 
First, in O’Reilly v. Morse, the Court recognized the concept of com-
plete preemption: When an applicant attempts to claim not only his in-
vention, but also future inventions that embody the same principle un-
derlying his invention, he or she is precluded from obtaining a patent 
for such a claim because he or she has essentially claimed the principle 
itself. The Court in Benson recognized de facto complete preemption: 
When there exists only one substantial practical application of an idea, 
a claim directed toward that one application is unpatentable. In Flook, 
the Court expressed that § 101 not only precludes complete preemp-
tion, but also simple limitations to a particular field of use or “post-
solution activity.” In Mayo, the Court seemed to acknowledge that what 
limitations of an idea are simple is subject to change over time.107 To wit, 
although natural laws and relationships are treated as though they ex-
ist apart from any human action, whether an invention is more than a 
trivial implementation of that law may depend on what is “well-
known” at the time of the invention.108 Thus, what constitutes a “sim-
ple step” from unpatentable subject matter will change over time, be-
cause the tools available to inventors implementing an idea will 
change. 
The oral argument dialogue is particularly informative in demon-
strating the qualitative analysis for preemption. In response to ques-
tions by Justice Kennedy during oral argument, counsel for petitioners 
effectively conceded that that the patent at issue was an invention that 
could be programmed in a relatively short time (“a weekend”), by 
someone of ordinary skill in the art (“a second-year college class”) on a 
generic computer. Although the Court does not explicitly acknowledge 
these factors, it held that a “wholly generic computer implementation” 
is insufficient for patentability, and that the claims at issue here were 
 
 106.  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189 (emphasis added). 
 107.  See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297. 
 108.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 585, 592 (1978) (“We think the case must be considered as if 
the principle being well known.”), Id. at 593 n.15. (“The underlying notion is that a scientific prin-
ciple, such as that expressed in respondent’s algorithm, reveals a relationship that has always ex-
isted”). 
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tantamount to stating ‘apply this idea’ to a computer.109 Thus, in ana-
lyzing the computer program as merely a “generic implementation,” 
the Court tacitly recognized a qualitative inquiry into the simplicity of 
implementation. The rule in Alice is ultimately that when an implemen-
tation of an idea is “generic,” that idea is effectively preempted, and a 
claim capturing that generic implementation is therefore not patenta-
ble. 
2. The functions § 101 provides in limiting patentable subject mat-
ter that §§ 102 and 103 do not 
One way § 101 clearly preludes patentability where § 103 does 
not is in the context of natural laws and naturally occurring substances 
generally. If a person discovers a natural law or naturally occurring 
substance and attempts to patent it, the only source of prior art is na-
ture itself. To wit, laws of nature and naturally occurring substances 
are inherently “practiced” by nature, and thus are not novel.110 
One celebrated law of nature that the Supreme Court frequently 
declares could not be patented is E=mc2.111 The law itself, the inter-
changeability of mass and energy (as opposed to the mathematical 
formula) is ubiquitous in nature, the sun’s fusion of hydrogen and heli-
um being one of numerous examples. Thus, even if Einstein was the 
first to postulate the universal truth of nature’s mass-energy relation-
ship, nature has been inherently undergoing the mass-energy conver-
sion process for billions of years. In the novelty context, previously un-
appreciated discoveries about the way things already in existence 
operate do not give rise to invention if they were already part of the 
public domain. However, prior art under §§ 102 (novelty) and 103 
(non-obviousness) is confined to printed publications, offers for sale, 
and other forms of commercial exploitation, all of which are works of 
man. Thus, § 101 carves out patentable subject matter in which nature 
has practiced even if man has not written about or applied those sub-
jects. 
 
 109.  Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2350–51. 
 110.  Inherency is a concept that already exists for prior art references under §§ 102 (novelty) 
and 103 (non-obviousness): “[T]he discovery of a previously unappreciated property of a prior 
art composition, or of a scientific explanation for the prior art’s functioning, does not render the 
old composition patentably new to the discoverer.” Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 
1347, (Fed. Cir. 1999). In other words, a reference can anticipate or render obvious a claimed in-
vention on the basis of express or inherent disclosure. Thus the claiming of a new use, new func-
tion or unknown property which is already present in the prior art does not necessarily make the 
claim patentable. In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1254 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
 111.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. 
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In patent law generally, though an invention may have a certain 
novel patina, the invention must ultimately be comprised of more than 
a generic implementation of what already exists either in nature or in 
the corpus of human knowledge. It is perhaps useful to think of natural 
laws and naturally occurring substances as just another form of prior 
art, “§ 101 art.” Just as obviousness prevents patentability for taking an 
invention and simply substituting one material for another, § 101 pre-
vents a person from taking what existed previously in nature and 
simply finding a trivial application. The next section explores the “ge-
neric implementation” doctrine under § 101 more definitively. 
3. What the generic implementation standard is and how it is dis-
tinct from analysis under §§ 102 and 103 
Although the generic implementation requirement112 significantly 
overlaps with the novelty and non-obviousness analysis under §§ 102 
and 103, respectively, it specifically carves out patentable subject mat-
ter where §§ 102 and 103 do not. In Alice, the Court appeared to un-
dergo a vague, ‘quasi-obviousness’ analysis in breaking down each 
function in the software and finding that each one constituted a “well-
understood, routine, conventional, activit[y] previously known to the 
industry.”113 However, it was not simply the fact that the idea existed 
before that was problematic. Rather, it was the simplicity with which 
one could apply the idea to a computer that troubled the Court. The 
novelty and non-obviousness of components is relevant in determining 
whether the invention is more than a simple step from the unpatenta-
ble subject matter. This doctrine comports with traditional property 
rights values; a patent should not be granted where the invention 
would not have been disclosed or devised but-for the grant of a patent. 
Phrased another way, if an applicant would not have sought a patent 
on an invention that took limited time and skill to implement if it were 
not for the patent system, then the applicant should not be entitled to 
the exclusive use of that invention. 
Furthermore, § 101 may preclude patentability where § 103 (non-
obviousness) does not if there existed an “infinite set of solutions” or 
unpredictable solutions to the inventor at the time of invention, but the 
inventor employed a well-known and conventional methodology in ar-
 
 112.  For the sake of this paper, “generic” means “having no particularly distinctive quality or 
application” and implementation means “the process of putting a decision or plan into effect; exe-
cution.” Thus a generic implementation, according to my definition, is one where there is “no par-
ticularly distinctive quality in the process of executing an invention.” 
 113.  134 S. Ct. at 2358 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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riving at the solution/invention. In KSR v. Teleflex, the Court explained 
how a finding of obviousness could be based on the secondary factor of 
§ 103, “obvious to try.”114 The Court in that case opined that using a 
known process to solve a problem when there are a finite number of 
predictable solutions and a person of ordinary skill knows to pursue 
those solutions, the result will be obvious.115 In other words, even if a 
solution is not known at the time before the applicant starts trying the 
different solutions but there are a limited number of predictable solu-
tions, one of which includes his claimed invention, the applicant may 
not have the benefit of a patent from the invention because it is obvi-
ous. An applicant can escape this rationale, however, if there are un-
predictable solutions, but there are still a limited number of avenues to 
pursue.116 Accordingly, it is perhaps a flaw of § 103 (insofar as it con-
flicts with general notions of what should be patentable) that certain 
applicants can circumvent obviousness when they can persuasively ar-
gue that there were an infinite set of solutions or that there were un-
predictable solutions, despite the fact that the applicants employed a 




















 114.  KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).  
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Even if a solution falls within a small range of values, for example, between 0 and 1, 
there are infinitely many values between 0 and 1 according to mathematics. 
§ 101 § 103 
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In Mayo, for example, the Court recognized that the only inventive 
aspect of the claim was the range of values for which the patentee had 
discovered the optimal values for therapeutic efficacy.117 The patentee 
did not invent the thiopurine drug, and scientists were already well 
aware of the correlation between therapeutic efficacy and toxicity.118 
Thus, the patentee had simply implemented standard tests to discover 
what the previously unknown range was.119 Arguably, the discovery of 
the optimal range was inevitable, and perhaps obvious under the defi-
nition of § 103. But other cases suggest that employing known meth-
ods without a reasonable expectation of success, e.g. where there exists 
infinitely many possibilities for variation, and prior art gives no indica-
tion of parameters that are likely to be critical, there may be a finding 
of non-obviousness.120 Nothing in the facts of Mayo suggested that sci-
entists at the time of the invention necessarily knew which parameters 
might be optimal. Nonetheless, without undue experimentation, the 
patentee could potentially escape obviousness (albeit narrowly) and 
obtain a patentable invention using well-known techniques if § 101 did 
not preclude patentability. Thus, if § 101 precludes patentability for 
“generic implementations,” it may serve to prohibit patentability for 
inventions that are non-obvious under traditional secondary consider-
ations of § 103. 
4. WHAT ROLE § 101 PROVIDES IN LIMITING PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
THAT § 112 DOES NOT AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS. 
Section 112 requires, inter alia, that the specification provides a 
written description of the claimed invention and enables the claimed 
invention. Section 101, broadly speaking, precludes claims encompass-
ing all uses of an idea and naturally occurring substances. If a patentee 
simply claims an idea itself, it is possible that all uses may be enabled. 
As discussed in Part III(B), Morse’s claim included literally all uses of 
writing at a distance using electricity, but because he did not enable all 
uses of the idea his claim would more likely be rejected or invalidated 
under § 112. However, claims that cover substantially every practical 
application, or claims that cover a generic implementation, would not 
be rejected under § 112 for lack of enablement per se. If the specifica-
tion (1) enables and describes uses for substantially every practical 
 
 117.  Alice, 132 S. Ct. at 1295.  
 118.  Id.  
 119.  Id.  
 120.  In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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application of the underlying idea or (2) the claims are narrowed to 
one or more generic implementations of the underlying idea, both such 
claims are still enabled. 
In the first situation, when a claim encompasses substantially all 
uses of an idea, and the claim is enabled by the specification, the doc-
trine of de facto complete preemption articulated in Benson prevents 
patentability. In the second situation, when a claim is narrowed to one 
or more generic implementations of an idea, the generic implementa-
tion standard prevents a patentee from effectively asserting ownership 
of an idea. Recall that in Alice, the Court remarked that a “wholly gener-
ic computer implementation is not generally the sort of additional fea-
ture that provides any practical assurance that the process is more 
than a drafting effort to monopolize the abstract idea itself.”121 Howev-
er, the Court did not adequately explain how a claim capturing a gener-
ic implementation can prevent every use of the “abstract idea.” 
One possible way a patentee could capture other uses of a general 
idea, when other uses have not been specifically claimed, is through 
the use of the doctrine of equivalents. Under the doctrine of equivalents, 
a patentee may assert non-literal infringement of claims when the de-
fendant’s activity is one that an ordinary practitioner would recognize 
as a substantial equivalent to the patentee’s claim at the time of in-
fringement.122 The potential danger of generic implementation claims 
lies in the ability of the patentee to assert infringement on other uses 
of the “abstract idea.” One approach to using the doctrine of equiva-
lents is to construct a hypothetical patent claim that literally covers the 
defendant’s activity, and determine whether the hypothetical claim 
could have been allowed by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
over the prior art.123 Notably this inquiry is not limited by what claims 
would have been granted under § 112, but only §§ 102 (novelty) and 
103 (non-obviousness).124 Thus, under this analysis, a patentee, such 
as the one in Bilski, could hypothetically draft his or her claim to limit 
the concept of hedging to energy markets, and may assert infringement 
against a defendant in the real estate market, for instance, claiming 
that it is a “substantial equivalent” to the energy market. In this way, 
the patentee in Bilski could have effectively claimed the abstract idea of 
hedging by being able to assert his patent against other defendants 
 
 121.  134 S. Ct. at 2358 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 122.  See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997). 
 123.  Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed Cir. 1990). 
 124.  See id.  
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that practice substantial equivalents. More generally, if an applicant 
were granted a patent to a generic implementation claim that satisfies 
the requirements of § 112, the patentee could effectively claim every 
application of an abstract idea by being able to assert non-literal in-
fringement of the claim via the doctrine of equivalents. Thus, the ge-
neric implementation requirement performs a role in prohibiting 
claims that would otherwise satisfy the requirements of § 112. 
5.  The generic implementation requirement does not contravene 
other provisions of § 103 
In § 103, there is a provision that states, “Patentability shall not be 
negated by the manner in which the invention was made.” While the 
generic implementation requirement necessitates an inquiry into the 
manner in which an invention could be made, it does not require an 
inquiry into the manner in which the invention was made per se, and 
thus is not in contravention of § 103. 
This provision in § 103 was intended to abolish the test of patent-
ability expressed in the controversial phrase “flash of genius test,” one 
of the standards utilized before the passage of the 1952 Patent Act.125 
The new standard intended to make it immaterial whether the inven-
tion resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a flash of ge-
nius.126 The flash of genius test is distinguishable from the “generic im-
plementation” standard, which inquires not into the manner in which 
the actual invention was made, but into the manner in which an em-
bodiment of the invention could be made. While it may be probative to 
inquire into the manner in which the patentee manufactured the in-
vention, the patentee need not demonstrate that the invention re-
quired long toil and experimentation, for example. Rather, it should be 
sufficient to show that a person of ordinary skill could not implement 
the invention with relative ease. 
6. How courts can more uniformly evaluate whether an invention 
is patentable subject matter under § 101 
The standard I suggest in this section is nothing more than what 
was proffered with § 103 at the time of the 1952 Patent Act: A “substi-
tute that would make more sense, would apply to all kinds of inven-
tions, would restrict the courts in their arbitrary, a priori judgments on 
patentability, and that, above all, would serve as a uniform standard of 
 
 125.  Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966). 
 126.  Id. at 16 n.8.  
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patentability.”127 In Alice, the Supreme Court hinted at a qualitative as-
sessment of whether a patent in practice amounts to significantly more 
than a patent upon an ineligible concept itself.128 Thus, what I suggest 
is a more rigorous standard that is consistent with current Supreme 
Court precedent, one that focuses on common factors that might make 
an invention sufficiently ‘non-generic.’ 
In Alice, the Court explicitly considered that “improv[ing] the func-
tioning for the computer” or “improv[ing] any other technology”129 
would have lent to the patentability of a computer program. How one 
can extrapolate this principle more generally is uncertain. Clearly in-
ventions that improve the performance of the computer improve the 
functioning, but there is absolutely no reason why software patents 
should be narrowly restricted to those that improve the performance 
of the computer. In fact, it is likely that very few software programs, 
which operate at the highest level of abstraction, are going to improve 
the performance of a computer at the hardware level.130 Looking out-
side the four corners of the Alice opinion, we see there were at least 
two qualitative factors that influenced the Justices’ opinion that the 
claimed invention was a generic application during oral argument. The 
first factor is the amount of time it would take to create and integrate 
the software into a system, and the second is the amount of skill re-
quired to implement the software.131 Other contributory, non-
dispositive factors conceivably are: 
I. To what extent does the software improve the perfor-
mance of the computer? 
II. To what extent is the computer running the software a 
‘generic computer,’ i.e., what functions does the software 
provide that are unavailable to an ordinary computer? 
III. To what extent could well-known, conventional program-
ming, analytical techniques, etc. be used to implement the 
claimed software? 
IV. To what extent is the software a simple automation of a 
previously manual process? 
 
 127.  Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the “Invention” Requirement, in NONOBVIOUSNESS: THE 
ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 1:508 (J. Witherspoon ed., 1980) (emphasis in original). 
 128.  See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
 129.  134 S. Ct. at 2359. 
 130.  See generally, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 42–45 (D. 
Mass. 1990). 
 131.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, 12, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 
2347 (2014) (No. 13-298). 
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Fig. 2 
V. To what extent does the software solve a technological 
problem on a computer?132 
Though not an exhaustive list of considerations, these are sug-
gested factors for evaluating whether a particular software patent is 
eligible for patentability under § 101. 
More generally, the inquiry for whether a patent is an unpatenta-
ble “abstract idea” should start with resolving what the underlying idea 
of the patent is in the first place, before determining whether the sub-
ject matter is “directed to an ineligible category.”133 Once there is a de-
termination of the underlying idea, the test will vary depending on 
whether the idea contains a law of nature or naturally occurring sub-
















 132.  See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (2014), see also Pete Sad-
ler, Six Tips for Patenting Computer Games in Europe, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROP., Nov. 24, 2014, 
at 22.  
 133.  Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
What is the underlying idea? 
Does it contain a law of na-
ture, mathematical formula, or 
naturally occurring substance? 
 
Considering (1) and (2), is the inven-
tion as a whole significantly more than a 
generic implementation of the law of 
nature or naturally occurring substance? 
2. Starting with the subject matter as it 
existed before the invention, is the inven-
tion as a whole something that could 
have been created by a POSITA using 
well-known, conventional techniques, 
without undue experimentation? 
1. To what extent does the invention 
utilize the law of nature or naturally 
occurring substance? 
If yes, then the subject 
matter is patentable under 
Section 101. 











Can the invention as a whole be 
implemented by a POSITA us-
ing well known and conven-
tional techniques, without un-
due experimentation? 
If no, then the subject mat-
ter is not patentable under 
Section 101. 
 
If claim contains a 
law of nature, or nat-
urally occurring sub-
stance, then apply 
three factor test: 
If claim does not con-
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In the lower portion of Figure 2, the second step involves deter-
mining whether the invention as a whole could be implemented by a 
person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) using well known and 
conventional techniques, without undue experimentation. This “undue 
experimentation standard” borrows language from § 112, which is the 
test for whether a particular claim is enabled by the specification. In 
other words, if the invention is in a sense self-enabling, then the inven-
tion is nothing more than an “abstract idea.” 
In the upper portion of Figure 2, there is a three factor test for 
when the patent claims a law of nature or naturally occurring sub-
stance: 
1. To what extent does the invention utilize the law of nature 
or naturally occurring substance? 
2. Analyzing the subject matter as it existed before the inven-
tion, is the invention as a whole something that could have 
been created by a POSITA using well-known, conventional 
techniques without undue experimentation? 
3. Considering the analysis in the first two prongs, is the in-
vention as a whole nothing more than a generic implemen-
tation of the law of nature or naturally occurring sub-
stance? 
The upper portion of Figure 2 involves a careful weighing of the 
factors to determine whether the claimed subject matter is nothing 
more than a natural law or naturally occurring substance, using lan-
guage from Bilski, Mayo, and Alice. This test is designed to be flexible 
and allow for some discretion, while providing bounds for a court to 
decide the eligibility of subject matter within a series of factors. While 
the test is not bright-line, it should create more certainty than available 
currently, where patentable subject matter is determined by the ipse 
dixit of the trial judge, examiner, or other reviewing party. Part V is a 
brief look at some recent developments to emphasize the need for a 
more rigorous approach. 
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Specter of Pre-1952 Case Law 
The McRO case is alluded to in Part II as it is emblematic of a line 
of cases that pose particularly problematic implications for software 
patents generally. A brief history of the cases preceding the 1952 Pa-
tent Act is discussed in Part III to illustrate some of the parallels with 
current decisions of our time. Most importantly, McRO illustrates the 
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struggle with applying current precedent and the confusion created by 
the ambiguous language used by the Supreme Court. 
Recall the patent at issue in McRO was directed toward automatic 
lip synchronization and facial expression of three dimensional animat-
ed characters.134 According to the court’s explanation of the patents, 
the old method of moving animated lips required manually setting an 
appropriate “morph weight” to move the mouth a percentage of the 
way to a corresponding “morph target.”135 This process required the 
artist to manually sets the morph weights for each animation se-
quence—a process that was time consuming, tedious, and inaccu-
rate.136 Thus, the invention claimed in the patent at issue in McRO was 
a significant improvement on the prior art, because it rapidly increased 
animation time and reduced production costs.137 However, the defend-
ants in McRO averred that the animation method was merely a series of 
mathematical steps applied on computer.138 
In setting the legal framework in McRO, the trial court acknowl-
edged that the Supreme Court cases are of “limited utility”139 and chose 
to apply essentially a “one-step” transformation test, to see if the pa-
tent preempted all applications of an idea.140 The court explained: “[a]t 
first blush, it is. . .difficult to see how the claims might implicate the 
basic underlying concern these patents tie up too much of future use of 
any abstract idea to which they apply.”141 Following Alice, the court 
proceeded to break down each limitation in the claim to see what steps 
were present in the prior art, and which steps were novel without the 
aid of an expert or jury.142 The court declared that “where a claim re-
cites tangible steps, but the only new part of the claim is an abstract 
idea, that may constitute a claim to an abstract idea.”143 In this case, the 
“inventive step” was the use of timing rules, but because the patentee 
attempted to preempt any rules that may develop, that left an “abstract 
idea at the point of novelty.”144 Not surprisingly, the specific “imple-
mentation” of the rules was not specified by the claims, but in the latter 
 
 134.  McRO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135152 at *4. 
 135.  Id. at *6.  
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at *7. 
 139.  Id. at *13 
 140.  Id. at *12, *19. 
 141.  Id. at *23 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 142.  Id. at *26. 
 143.  Id. at *25 (emphasis added).  
 144.  Id. at *32. 
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half of the specification.145 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the 
“novel portions of [the] invention are claimed too broadly” because the 
claims were directed to all uses of “timing rules” rather than to a “par-
ticular implementation that is not specified by the claims.”146 
There are multiple problems with this analysis. First, the enact-
ment of § 112 accomplishes the function of requiring the applicant to 
“particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter. . .” 
Second, § 112’s written description and enablement requirements are 
typically what limit the patentee’s broad claiming of a particular ge-
nus.147 The trial court’s opinion anticipates this objection: 
Scholars have argued that the written description and enablement 
doctrines of § 112 . . . do not adequately prevent unwarranted ob-
structions to follow-on innovation, and have urged that § 101 can 
and should do so. See, e.g., Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1315, 1330 (2011) (cited in Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301-03, 1304); 
but see Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1253, 1279 
(2011) (“[T]here is good reason to worry about overbroad patent 
claims that lock up a wide swath of potential future applications. But 
the enablement and written description doctrines largely address that 
concern.”).148 
Even under its own logic, the court in McRO should have taken in-
to consideration that § 101 need not be expanded when § 112 can 
clearly limit the overbroad claiming of the “timing rules[;]” the inven-
tor has failed to distinctly claim those rules, had not enabled the use of 
all rules in the specification, or had otherwise failed to provide 
suffcient written description to show that he is in possession of the ge-
nus of “timing rules.”149 
The most troubling aspect of the trial court’s opinion in McRO was 
its reliance on Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., a pre-1952 de-
cision whose logic regarding functional claiming was abrogated with 
the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act.150 In fact, the court appeared to 
derive its new ‘insight’ on how to apply Alice almost entirely from this 
obsolete Supreme Court precedent: “This . . . analysis [from Alice] 
 
 145.  See United States Patent No. 6,307,576 (filed Oct. 23, 2001).. 
 146.  McRO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135152 at *32, *34, *38.  
 147.  See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Claims 
define and circumscribe, the written description discloses and teaches.”) 
 148.  McRO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135152 at *17 (emphasis added).  
 149.  Any claim that uses purely functional language, or covers a broad genus without suffi-
cient supporting examples, will not be enabled. See, e.g., In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495–96 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991) (affirming enablement rejection of genus claims). 
 150.  304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938), see Mark A. Lemley, Address: Robert W. Kastenmeier Lecture 
Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 905, 907 (2013), availa-
ble at https://web.stanford.edu/dept/law/ipsc/Paper%20PDF/Lemley,%20Mark%20-
%20Paper.pdf. 
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tracks the law’s long-standing concern with patents that consist of old 
material with the addition of a new, but abstract, idea: ‘the vice of a 
functional claim exists . . . when the inventor is painstaking when he 
recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently func-
tional language at the exact point of novelty.’”151 The 1952 Patent Act 
created 35 U.S.C. § 112 (paragraph 6) to allow for claim language to be 
“expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function 
without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof,” 
provided that its specification provides the “corresponding structure, 
material, or acts. . .”152 Thus, whether or not a claim uses functional 
language at the point of novelty is irrelevant, what matters is whether 
there are “structures. . .[etc.]” recited in the specification which satisfy 
the requirements of § 112 (enablement, written description, etc.) and 
other statutory sections. 
The McRO decision reflects the confusion of courts in applying Al-
ice. Left without a standard of determining whether a patent is di-
rected to an “abstract idea,” courts inevitably search for clues in the 
graveyards of legal jurisprudence, only to dig up obsolete and long-
rejected notions of patentability. The court in McRO could have bene-
fited from a more structured analysis into whether the claims, con-
strued in light of the specification, were more than a generic imple-
mentation of automated lip syncing using timing rules. The court 
should have stressed, for instance, that the invention did in fact im-
prove the performance of the computer because it increased the pro-
cessing speed for animation of three dimensional characters. The court 
ultimately should have inquired into how difficult it would be for a 
POSITA to implement the underlying idea of automated lip syncing ra-
ther than dismissing the case without any factual basis. Instead, the 
court in McRO made a superficial determination that the patent in suit 
was overly broad, relying only on its elementary knowledge of com-
puter science and completely disregarding the distinct functions of the 
various sections of the Patent Act. 
B. Ultramercial – Dawn of a New Era? 
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu LLC., one of the first cases by the CAFC to 
follow Alice is likely a signal to the Supreme Court that the CAFC in-
tends to use § 101 as a tool for resolving patentable subject matter at 
 
 151.  See McRO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135152 at *25 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appli-
ance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)). 
 152.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).  
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the outset.153 Ultramercial was brought to the CAFC for the third time 
after the Supreme Court had granted, vacated, and remanded the case 
following Mayo, and again after Alice.154 The politics of this situation 
are not complicated; with Chief Judge Rader gone, and having been re-
versed six times in one term, the CAFC’s era of intransigence may have 
come to an end. Despite its reservations, it appears that the CAFC plans 
to follow the Supreme Court § 101 precedent.155 
In Ultramercial, the CAFC adopted the district court’s determina-
tion of the underlying abstract idea of the patent that an advertisement 
can be used as an exchange or currency.156 The first claim at issue spe-
cifically included eleven steps for displaying an advertisement in ex-
change for access to copyrighted content.157 The court  held that “[t]his 
ordered combination of steps recites an abstraction—an idea, having 
no particular concrete or tangible form.”158 Other than a few comments 
about the idiosyncratic features of the program itself, the first half of 
the opinion appears to be nothing more than a cut-and-paste of Alice 
into the opinion: “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include 
‘additional features’ . . . [a]dding routine additional steps such as up-
dating an activity log, requiring a request from the consumer to view 
the ad . . . [other steps of process] . . . does not transform an otherwise 
abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.”159 
In the second half of the opinion, the CAFC applied a nuanced ver-
sion of its old “machine-or-transformation test,” recalling that the Su-
preme Court said that the test is a “useful clue”.160 For the machine 
prong, the CAFC decided that the claims of the patent were “not tied to 
any particular novel machine or apparatus, only a general purpose 
computer” due to recitation of conventional elements.161 The court did 
not explain, for instance, why a general purpose computer is not a ma-
chine, or why the particular elements mentioned were conventional. 
The court concluded that transformation from the use on a computer is 
 
 153.  772 F.3d 709, 713 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  But see DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (2014) (upholding a 
patent directed toward pop-up advertisements that produce a page that retains the host website’s 
look and feel, the court the patent valid and distinguished Ultramercial on the basis the patent 
solved a technical problem that “specifically ar[ose] in realm of computer networks” and that the 
solution “is necessarily rooted in computer technology”). 
 156.  Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 714 (quoting Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 93453 at *17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013)).  
 157.  Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 714. 
 158.  Id. at 715. 
 159.  Id. at 715-16. 
 160.  Id. at 716 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010)). 
 161.  Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716. 
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insufficient because it is “merely what computers do and does not 
change the analysis.”162 However, the claim in Ultramercial involving 
data manipulation in exchange for electronic payment is no less trans-
formative than Morse’s system of electronic communication which 
produced “intelligible characters, signs, or letters”163 
For the transformation prong, the CAFC held that the claim at is-
sue, “a transaction involving the grant of permission and viewing of an 
advertisement by the consumer, the grant of access by the content 
provider and the exchange of money between the sponsor and content 
provider[]” is insufficient because the abstractions in the claim are not 
representative of physical objects or substances.164 The CAFC stated 
generally that transformations involving manipulations of “public or 
private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such 
abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects 
or substances, and they are not representative of physical objects or 
substances.”165 There are two problems with this syllogism. The first 
problem is the court’s assertion that elements of the claim are not rep-
resentative of physical objects. Such interactions in the claimed pro-
cess are in fact necessarily tied to concrete interactions. The grant of 
access (for the “preferred embodiment”) involves sending electronic 
signals over a telecommunications network and exhibiting a message 
to the consumer.166 And though the exchange of money may occur elec-
tronically, it is no less physical than one’s bank account balance viewed 
through an online bank service. Second, even if the transactions are 
somehow not tied to physical objects, there is no reason that a trans-
formation needs to be tied to a particular “physical object[] or sub-
stance[]” rather than a “relationship” or other such abstraction such as 
business risk. 
“[A] process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form 
of the instrumentalities used.”167 A transformation may occur for rela-
tionships between one or more physical objects, for example, and these 
relationships may be manipulated in various steps of a process. “A ma-
chine is a thing. A process is an act, or a mode of acting. The one is visi-
 
 162.  Id. at 717. 
 163.  O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112 (1853) (internal quotations omitted), see Mackay Radio 
& Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 91 (1939) (finding no infringement but uphold-
ing a patent on an “antenna system utilizing standing wave phenomena”). 
 164.  Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 717. 
 165.  Id. at 717 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (2008)). 
 166.  Method and System for Payment of Intellectual Property Royalties by Interposed Spon-
sor on Behalf of Consumer over a Telecommunications Network, U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545, col. 4, 
line 36 (filed May 29, 2001). 
 167.  Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876). 
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ble to the eye,—an object of perpetual observation. The other is a con-
ception of the mind, seen only by its effects when being executed or 
performed. Either may be the means of producing a useful result.”168 
Manipulating macroscopic quantities, such as business risk, may be a 
“conception of the mind” but can still produce a “useful result[]” within 
the meaning of the Patent Act.169 Other macroscopic quantities, such as 
temperature and pressure, for example, describe relationships be-
tween the many atoms in a given sample.170 A “business risk” as a mac-
roscopic economic quantity similarly represents a perception of the re-
lationships between individual people in an economic system, and is 
no less an abstraction than temperature and pressure, and thus should 
not be categorically barred from making a patentable transformation. 
While the court stressed that not “all claims in all software-based 
patents will necessarily be directed to an abstract idea[,]”171 the CAFC’s 
lack of rigor in tailoring the analysis specifically to the patent at issue 
will most likely cause great difficulty for software claims to overcome § 
101. A court following Ultramercial could easily apply the aforemen-
tioned analysis to any computer software patent by picking apart ele-
ments that are individually “well-known” or “conventional” and then 
declare that the software as a whole is merely an abstract idea. Busi-
ness method patents are particularly at risk, because many of them in-
volve manipulations of public or private legal obligations, which the 
CAFC regards as mere unpatentable “abstractions.”172 
Even more troubling is the procedural posture. In Ultramercial, 
the CAFC adjudicated the § 101 issue on a motion to dismiss under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), without any regard for the presumption of validi-
ty.173  By being able to decide the question of patentable subject matter 
at the outset of a case, courts may inject their personal views into de-
termining which patents should and should not issue without making a 
single factual finding and without any structured analysis. Beyond 
mere subjectivity, there are other compelling reasons to doubt the effi-
cacy of using § 101 as a gateway for patentability. Ex ante, it is difficult, 
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if not impossible, for a court of limited expertise in computer science to 
determine without claim construction, expert testimony, and other ev-
identiary proceedings what sort of software patents might successfully 
transform a general purpose computer into one that passes muster 
under § 101. Moreover, the Supreme Court has provided only a handful 
of examples of technological elements that are insufficient to add an 
“inventive concept,” and gives no indication of what technological ele-
ments might be sufficient.174 
Additionally, the concurring opinion in Ultramercial strongly re-
flects the CAFC’s intent to resolve subject matter eligibility at the out-
set of a case in order to provide courts with a lethal weapon to mitigate 
the ‘patent troll’ problem and protect the public.175 Nevertheless, the 
majority opinion is conspicuously bereft of any useful guiding princi-
ples for courts to distinguish meritorious patents and broad, vacuous 
patents typically asserted by patent trolls. There can be no doubt that 
the approach taken in Ultramercial might curb assertion of the kind of 
patents that are possessed by patent trolls in large portfolios because 
of the expediency with which a court can dispose of the suit. However, 
under the guise of searching for an “inventive concept,” judges may be 
free to “decide the controlling factor according to [their] personal phi-
losophy of what inventions shouldn’t be patented, whether or not [they 
have] any competence to do so or any knowledge of the patent system 
as an operative socioeconomic force.” 176 In today’s world, without a 
principled way to separate patents that are the product of innovation 
and contribute meaningfully to the “Progress of Science and useful 
Arts” from the patents that do not, courts will harm not only patent 
trolls, but also small companies who rely on the patent system to com-
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has been less than precise in delineating the 
ineligible categories of patentable subject matter. The question of pa-
tentability has never been more uncertain, at least not since before the 
1952 Patent Act was enacted. Predictability is imperative in ensuring 
that the patent system remains an integral part of business economics 
and continues to act as a powerful legal force to incentivize research 
and development. The Court’s “inventive application” requirement 
could potentially make all patent claims vulnerable to challenge under 
§ 101, whether or not the patentee has created an invention “worth to 
the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent.”178 Pertaining to 
software, the specter of invalidation under § 101 looms large, and gives 
trial courts the opportunity to summon it upon a whim and defeat pa-
tents without trial, without expert testimony, without objective con-
siderations of a patent’s merit,  nor any regard for the patent as an 
economic tool for promoting innovation. The Court’s most recent deci-
sion, Alice, created an unworkable and nonsensical “two-part test,” one 
that belied the Court’s true reasoning why the software at issue was 
merely a “generic implementation” of the abstract idea of mitigating 
settlement risk. Looking beyond the Court’s opinion in Alice, courts at 
all levels could benefit from using a more rigorous, qualitative test in 
determining whether a patent is directed to one of the ineligible cate-
gories of patentable subject matter. On such test, self-enablement, can 
be structured from the Court’s current case law, and can limit the 
broad range of software patents left vulnerable under current § 101 
jurisprudence. Regardless of whether a test for patentable subject mat-
ter is fashioned through judicial or legislative means, only through the 
use of principled decision-making will courts be able to maintain the 
integrity of the patent system. 
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